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JURISDICTION OVER APPEAL
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
A. Did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that the Ute Indian
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Tribe") is a necessary and indispensable
party under Utah R. Civ. P. 19? "Ordinarily, a trial court's determination properly
entered under Rule 19 will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Seftel v.
Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Landes v.
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted); Turville v. J. & J.
Props., L.C., 2006 UT App 305, 24, 145 P.3d 1146, 1150.
B. When the Tribe seeks to regulate business activities occurring solely on the
Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation ("Reservation"), is there a need for the court to
balance the equities of the State and the Tribe? Because this is a question of law, a
"correctness standard" applies. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d
194, 196 (Utah 1991).
C. Was the district court correct to grant a Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims against the Defendants-Appellees Dino Ray
Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose, and Sheila Wopsock in their individual capacities (the
"Individual Defendants") and LaRose Construction Company, Inc. and D. Ray C.
Enterprises, L.L.C., (the "Company Defendants"), including claims for (1) "extortion,"
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(2) "blacklisting" in violation of article XII, section 19 and article XVI, section 4 of the
Utah Constitution, (3) unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the Utah Antitrust Act
and article XII, section 20 of the Utah Constitution, (4) civil conspiracy, and (5) tortious
interference with economic relations? Because "the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a
question of law," the district court's ruling is reviewed under a "correctness standard."
St, Benedict's Dev, Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d at 196.
D. Assuming Plaintiffs-Appellants have adequately briefed the issue, which
they did not, did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs-Appellants'
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(d) motion for supplemental pleadings? "A motion to amend under
Rule 15(d) is addressed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court. . ." Sw. Nurseries,
LLC v. Florists Mut. Ins., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (citation
omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition by District
Court
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed this action on April 5, 2013 in the Eighth Judicial
District Court, Duchesne County, State of Utah, Civil No. 13000009. (R. 1-21.) The
original Complaint sought declaratory relief with respect to the Tribe's exercise of
authority and asserted claims for tortious interference with economic relations and
extortion against the Individual Defendants. (Id.) On May 1, 2013, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the Complaint. On July 17, 2013, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a motion
for leave to file an amended complaint. (R. 431-35.)
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On July 22, 2013, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. The court
asked for additional briefing on the issue of whether the Tribe made a general appearance
in the case. (R. 477.)
On September 4, 2013, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed the Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief and Damages ("Amended Complaint"). (R. 548-
79.) On September 20, 2013, the Tribe filed a notice of removal to the United States
District Court, District of Utah. (R. 629-31.) The case was later remanded, and a motion
to stay proceedings was filed by certain defendants on August 24, 2014. (R. 648-55, 738-
48.) An order staying the case was entered on October 9, 2014. (R. 895-900.) The stay
was lifted on October 20, 2015. (R. 1141.)
On October 7, 2015, the Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants filed
their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (R. 198-200.) A hearing was scheduled
on the motion, as well as the motions to dismiss filed by all other parties, for January 29,
2016. The parties presented oral argument on that date. (R. 1947.) After oral argument,
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading. (R. 1469-
73.)
On March 28, 2016, the district court entered four written rulings dismissing all of
the claims in the case and denying the motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading.
(R. 1757-93.) On May 12, 2016, the district court entered its judgment dismissing all of
the claims in the action. (R. 2041-75.)
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B. Statement of Facts
The key fact alleged in the Amended Complaint is that on March 20, 2013, the Ute
Tribal Employment Rights Office ("UTERO") issued a letter (the "March 20 Letter"),
addressed to all oil and gas companies, signed by Sheila Wopsock in her capacity as
UTERO Director. (R. 53; a copy of the letter is attached to the Addendum as
Exhibit "A.") The March 20 Letter states that the Tribal Energy and Minerals
Department had "revoked the access permits" for "Rocks Off, Inc.-Ryan Harvey," among
other entities. The March 20 Letter further states that, based on the Tribal Energy and
Minerals Department's actions, the UTERO Commission had revoked the UTERO
license for the listed businesses, including Rocks Off, Inc., pursuant to a Tribal law called
the UTERO Ordinance, Ord. No. 10-002 (July 27, 2010). The March 20 Letter states
that, as
a result of such action, these businesses and individuals are no
longer authorized to perform work on the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation. Any use of these businesses and individuals by
an employer doing work on the Reservation after receipt of
this Notice may result in the assessment of penalties and/or
sanctions against such employer to the fullest extent of the
law.'
In their appeal brief of September 28, 2016 ("Appeal Brien, Plaintiffs-Appellants
do not accurately describe the contents of the March 20 Letter. For instance, Plaintiffs-
While claiming to provide this Court with the relevant portion of the March 20 Letter,
Plaintiffs-Appellants omitted the first sentence of the above quote, which provides key
context regarding the scope of the UTERO directive. (Brief of Pl.-App. at 31-32.)
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Appellants make the broad assertion that, on "March 20, 2015 [sic], Wopsock demanded
that all oil and gas companies cease doing business with Plaintiffs." (Brief of PL-App.
at 12.) They further argue that the demands "were not limited to Ute tribal lands." (Id.)
Plaintiffs-Appellants' characterizations go well beyond the actual contents of the
March 20 Letter, which makes no reference to Plaintiffs-Appellants' activities off of
Tribal lands. Also, citing page 562 of the record (which is page 15 of the Amended
Complaint), Plaintiffs-Appellants state that all "acts and occurrences complained of in the
Amended Complaint occurred on fee land outside of Ute tribal land." (Id. at 14.) This
language, however, does not appear at the cited portion of the Amended Complaint.
Instead, the Amended Complaint alleges that the "unlawful and unauthorized conduct has
caused and continues to cause substantial and irreparable harm to non-Indian Plaintiffs'
business activities on private fee land that is not Indian Country or reservation." (Id. at
44.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The district court correctly held that the Tribe is a necessary and
indispensable party in this proceeding. The majority of the Prayers for Relief in the
Amended Complaint ask the court to take action against the Tribe, and according to the
facts in the Amended Complaint, all of the actions by the Individual Defendants that
allegedly harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants occurred on Ute Tribal lands.
2. The questions of whether the Individual Defendants acted ultra vices and
beyond the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction are questions of law, not questions of fact,
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and as such, the court does not assume these legal conclusions to be true for purposes of a
Motion to Dismiss. Further, questions of whether the Individual Defendants acted ultra
vires (i.e., in violation of the UTERO Ordinance) and beyond the scope of the Tribe's
jurisdiction require an interpretation of Tribal law; therefore these questions are outside
the jurisdiction of the Utah state courts and would properly be heard by the Ute Tribal
Court.
3. A balancing of the interests of the State and the Tribe is not necessary in
this case because the Tribe is not attempting to regulate off-Reservation business
activities. Indeed, the Amended Complaint fails to allege a single business activity that
the Tribe or the Individual Defendants sought to regulate on non-Tribal land. The only
action the Individual Defendants took was to exercise authority over companies engaged
in business activities on Tribal lands, which is squarely within the Tribe's jurisdiction and
does not require a balancing of equities.
4. The district court correctly dismissed the claims against the Individual
Defendants because the Tribe's sovereign immunity bars the suit. Plaintiffs-Appellants
have not identified a single provision of the UTERO Ordinance that they believe the
Individual Defendants exceeded or violated, and in any event, only the Ute Tribal Court
can interpret the UTERO Ordinance and make an ultra vires determination. The Tribe is
the real party in interest with respect to questions of the scope of authority that the Tribe
is capable of bestowing on Tribal officials; yet the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable
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party that cannot be joined in this action, and the Ute Tribal Court has initial jurisdiction
over this question.
5. The district court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs-Appellants' tort claims
because they are not supported by.the facts in the record, and some of the alleged tort
claims do not even exist under Utah law.
6. The district court properly dismissed the claims against the Company
Defendants because the Amended Complaint fails to set out any facts supporting the
claims made against the Company Defendants.
7. The district court properly denied Plaintiffs-Appellants' motion for leave to
file a supplemental pleading.
ARGUMENT 
By and through counsel, the Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants
respectfully urge this Court to uphold the decision of the district court in this proceeding,
including the district court's holdings: (1) that the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable
party that has not been joined, (2) that the Individual Defendants are immune from suit
based on the Tribe's sovereign immunity, (3) that the Amended Complaint fails to allege
the necessary facts supporting the claims made against the Company Defendants, and
(4) dismissing all of Plaintiffs-Appellants' tort claims. As set out below, the district court
correctly found that, because all of the actions by the Individual Defendants that allegedly
harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants took place on Ute Tribal lands and were actions by an
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agency of the Ute Tribal government (i.e., the UThR0), this case belongs in Ute Tribal
Court.
In addition, certain of the arguments in Plaintiffs-Appellants' Appeal Brief rely on
the assertion of facts which do not appear in their Amended Complaint, such that they
may not be relied upon in this Appeal.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE TRIBE
IS A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY THAT HAS NOT
BEEN JOINED.
In their Appeal Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the Tribe is not a necessary
and indispensable party in this proceeding. (Brief of Pl.-App. at 19-28.) They claim that
the real focus of Plaintiffs-Appellants' case is the alleged actions of the individual Tribal
officials named as Defendants, and that the Tribe would really not be affected by a
decision against those Tribal officials because their alleged actions were ultra vices (i.e.,
beyond the scope of the UTERO Ordinance) and beyond the scope of authority that the
Tribe is capable of bestowing on them. (Id. at 23, 27-28.)
Plaintiffs-Appellants' position on appeal is defeated by the contents of the
Amended Complaint and by relevant case law. First, their assertion that the Tribe,
contrary to the holding below, does not have a critical interest in this proceeding, is
undercut by the fact that 11 of the 18 Prayers for Relief in the Amended Complaint ask
the court to take action against the Tribe. Second, according to the facts in the Amended
Complaint, all of the actions by the Individual Defendants that allegedly harmed
Plaintiffs-Appellants occurred on the Reservation; Plaintiffs-Appellants assert for the first
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time in the Appeal Brief that the Individual Defendants took actions off of the
Reservation that harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants. Third, Plaintiffs-Appellants conflate facts
with legal conclusions; the questions of whether the Individual Defendants acted ultra
vires and beyond the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction are questions of law, not questions
of fact. As such, contrary to Plaintiffs-Appellants' assertion, the court does not assume
these legal conclusions to be true for purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. Because these
questions have not been ruled on by a court, Plaintiffs-Appellants cannot properly make
the arguments in their Appeal Brief which assume as a "given" that the Individual
Defendants acted ultra vires or exceeded the jurisdiction of the Tribe. Finally, Plaintiffs-
Appellants fail to rebut the district court's holding, based on unbroken U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, that only the Ute Tribal Court may hear matters that require
interpretation of Ute Tribal law, such as the determination of whether the Individual
Defendants acted ultra vires in violation of the UTERO Ordinance.
A. Background Regarding the Tribe, UTERO, and UTERO Ordinance
The Ute Business Council, the legislative body of the Tribe, enacted the U1E,R0
Ordinance, which established the U1ERO. The UTERO Ordinance sets out the terms
and conditions upon which an employer may work on the Reservation, including
conditions regarding its selection of employees, subcontractors, and suppliers. (R. 1076.)
The Tribe enacted the Ult,R0 Ordinance in order to promote utilization of Indian
workers, subcontractors, and suppliers, and to ensure that anyone doing business on the
Reservation complies with the Tribe's laws. One mechanism for enforcing these
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requirements is to require all companies doing business on the Reservation — whether as
contractors, subcontractors, or suppliers — to obtain a business license from the UTERO.
(Id.) The UTERO Ordinance requires that all decisions by the UTERO regarding an
entity's compliance with the Ordinance must be made or approved by the three-member
UTERO Commission, a quasi-judicial body created by the Ordinance, with a right of
appeal to the Ute Tribal Courts. (R. 1111-15.) No person or company is required to do
business on Tribal lands, but if they choose to do so, they are required to comply with
Tribal law, including the UTERO's regulations.
As discussed supra, on March 13, 2013, the Tribal Energy and Minerals
Department revoked the access permit of Rocks Off, Inc.-Ryan Harvey, and as a result,
the UTERO Commission revoked Rocks Off, Inc.'s UTERO business licensee. Although
Plaintiffs-Appellants' facilities are located off of the Reservation, they were supplying
gravel and equipment for work that was being done on the Reservation by companies
such as Newfield Production Company, Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc., Newfield RMI,
LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. (collectively, "Newfield Defendants"). As
such, the UTERO sent the March 20 Letter to the Newfield Defendants and other oil and
gas companies doing business on the Reservation to inform them of the revocation.
The March 20 Letter states that it was issued by the UTERO pursuant to the
UTERO Ordinance. The UTERO Ordinance derives from the Tribe's authority to set
terms and conditions for businesses working on the Reservation, including terms and
conditions related to the selection of subcontractors and suppliers.
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The March 20 Letter makes no mention of any activities or business dealings of
Plaintiffs-Appellants occurring off of the Reservation. Thus, what occurred in the present
case is that the Tribe, by adopting the UTERO Ordinance, has exercised its sovereign
authority to determine who may do business within its jurisdiction and on what terms.
While Newfield is not required to work on the Reservation, if it chooses to do so, it must
comply with the Tribe's laws, including the requirement that it use only suppliers and
subcontractors licensed by the UTERO.
Plaintiffs-Appellants are unhappy with the actions by the U1 E,R0 Commission
that are set out in the March 20 Letter, but rather than challenging those actions by using
the procedures provided for in the U .1E,R0 Ordinance — i.e., an appeal to the Ute Tribal
Court — Plaintiffs-Appellants are seeking to circumvent those procedures by claiming that
the governmental actions by the Tribal officials involved, in their official and individual
capacities, constitute torts in the State of Utah. There is simply no precedent for using
tort actions in one jurisdiction to collaterally challenge official actions by governmental
officials in another jurisdiction.
Further, while Plaintiffs-Appellants assert that the March 20 Letter was the cause
of the harm they suffered and that the situs of the harm they suffered was off-Reservation
and in the State of Utah, the Amended Complaint does not contain a single allegation that
the Tribe, the UTERO, or the Individual Defendants sought to or did exercise any
authority off of the Reservation, sought to interfere with Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-
Reservation business activities, or imposed a boycott on Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-
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Reservation activities. The Amended Complaint fails to provide any allegation that the
Individual Defendants told companies subject to the UTERO's jurisdiction to stop doing
business with Plaintiffs-Appellants off of the Reservation. Nor does it contain any
examples of off-Reservation business opportunities that Plaintiffs-Appellants lost because
of the March 20 Letter or actions by the Individual Defendants. As indicated supra, the
March 20 Letter makes no reference to off-Reservation activities.
B. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Argument that the Tribe Is Not a Necessary and
Indispensable Party Is Flawed for Multiple Reasons.
The district court held that what is at stake in this case is the exercise of tribal
authority by the Ute Tribe over business activities within the Reservation, such that the
Tribe was a necessary and indispensable party. (R. 1772, 1776.) In their Appeal Brief,
making arguments that have no basis in the case law or the facts set out in the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellants assert that the Tribe did not have a significant interest in
the actions by the Individual Defendants because the Individual Defendants were
allegedly acting ultra vires (i.e., in violation of the UTERO Ordinance) and beyond the
scope of the jurisdiction that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them.
This argument fails for three reasons. First, it relies on Plaintiffs-Appellants'
mistaken impression that the court must accept as true for purposes of the Motion to
Dismiss and this Appeal the so-called "facts" that the Individual Defendants acted ultra
vires and beyond the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction, whereas in actuality these are not
facts but rather are legal questions that no court has yet ruled upon, and are not to be
deemed to be true for purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. Second, as the district court
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found, only the Ute Tribal Court has jurisdiction to interpret Ute Tribal law for purposes
determining whether certain actions were ultra vires and for making an initial
determination as to the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction. Third, even if this Court could
rule on those issues, the facts that Plaintiffs-Appellants allege in their Appeal Brief,
which they claim show that the Individual Defendants acted ultra vires and beyond the
scope of the Tribe's authority (particularly that the Individual Defendants interfered with
Plaintiffs-Appellants' business opportunities outside of Tribal lands), do not appear
anywhere in the Amended Complaint, such that these alleged facts set forth in the Appeal
Brief are not properly before this Court.
The following sections of this brief apply these three points separately to the claim
that the Individual Defendants exceeded the scope of the Tribe's authority and to the
claim that they acted ultra vires. While there are many similarities between these two
issues, there are also important differences that justify discussing them separately.
The Scope of the Authority that the Tribe Is Capable of
Bestowing on Its Officials
i. Whether the Individual Defendants Exceeded the
Authority that the Tribe Is Capable of Bestowing on
Them Is a Legal Question that No Court Has Ruled On,
Not a Fact
Plaintiffs-Appellants take it as a fact that the Individual Defendants exceeded the
scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them: "fflor purposes of
the motion before the trial court, the facts that the officials acted outside the scope of the
jurisdiction of the Ute Tribe must be assumed true." (Brief of Pl.-App. at 21.) This
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position is presumably based on a misreading of the principle that in a motion to dismiss,
all of the facts in the complaint are assumed to be true. However, a determination that
someone has exceeded the jurisdiction of a government is not a fact, it is a legal
conclusion. No court has found that the Individual Defendants exceeded the authority
that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them, so Plaintiffs-Appellants may not, as they
have, premise their argument on this issue. If in the future a court does evaluate the
scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on the UTERO officials, the
Tribe clearly will be a necessary and indispensable party in that proceeding, because
decisions about the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction go to the very heart of its
sovereignty.
ii. The Tribal Court Has the First Right to Rule on the Scope
of the Tribe's Jurisdiction.
Under well-established U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the forum that has the
initial authority to rule on the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction is the Ute Tribal Court.
(R. 1079-80.) See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("[T]he federal
policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to
give the tribal court a 'full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.'") (quoting Nat'l
Farmers Union Ins. Cos, v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)). See also
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) ("As to nonmembers, we hold, a
tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."). Thus, even
if Plaintiffs-Appellants had properly framed the issue as a legal question and asked the
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district court to rule on it, the district court would have lacked authority to do so until the
Tribal Court had issued a determination.
iii. Plaintiffs-Appellants Rely on Alleged Facts Not Contained
in Their Amended Complaint.
Assuming arguendo that the district court had the authority to consider this issue,
the alleged facts that Plaintiffs-Appellants set out in their Appeal Brief in support of their
assertion that the Individual Defendants exceeded the scope of the Tribe's authority do
not appear in their Amended Complaint, such that they are not properly before the court.
At the heart of Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that the Individual Defendants
exceeded the scope of the Tribe's authority (as well as their argument that the state courts
have an interest in this case) are the repeated representations in their Appeal Brief that the
Individual Defendants demanded that Newfield and other companies subject to the
Tribe's jurisdiction cease doing business with Plaintiffs-Appellants outside of Tribal
lands. See, e.g., Brief of Pl.-App. at 20 ("the directives are not limited to a prohibition
against use of Plaintiffs' Products on tribal ground") (emphasis in original); id. at 35
("The tribal officials [sic] demand was not limited to Ute Tribal land but a general
boycott of Plaintiffs' businesses.")
The problem with this assertion is that the Amended Complaint does not contain a
single allegation that the Tribe, the UTERO, or its officials sought to or did interfere with
Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-Reservation business dealings or imposed a boycott on
Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-Reservation activities. Nor does it contain any examples of off-
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Reservation business opportunities that Plaintiffs-Appellants lost because of the
March 20 Letter (which is not surprising, given that the Letter does not refer to off-
Reservation activities) or other actions by the Individual Defendants. The Amended
Complaint merely alleges that Plaintiffs-Appellants' businesses, which are located off the
Reservation, were hurt by the March 20 Letter; however, the location of their business
offices is not an "activity," nor does it describe an action taken by the UTERO officials
that caused a lost business opportunity off of the Reservation.
Rather, the allegations in the Amended Complaint regarding the harm to Plaintiffs-
Appellants' business dealings are limited to actions that the Individual Defendants
allegedly took on Tribal land. As the district court found (in the context of evaluating
Plaintiffs-Appellants' tort claims):
The facts set forth in the Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint establish,
at most, that Newfield was notified by UTERO that Rocks Offs access
permit had been revoked and were no longer authorized to conduct work on
tribal land, and that Newfield followed that directive by no longer utilizing
Rocks Off for work on tribal land.
(R. 1778.)
Thus, Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that the Tribe is not a necessary and indispensable
party because the Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of the Tribe's authority
fails because it relies on factual allegations that do not appear in the Amended Complaint.
Put another way — in a motion to dismiss, the alleged facts in a complaint are presumed to
be true, but the party opposing that motion is bound by those facts and may not create
new ones later for use in its legal arguments. All of Plaintiffs-Appellants' arguments
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based on an alleged factual foundation that the UTE,R0 officials acted outside Tribal
lands or beyond the scope of their authority must be rejected.
2. Ultra Vires
i. Whether the Individual Defendants Acted Ultra Vires of
the UTERO Ordinance Is a Legal Question that No Court
Has Ruled On, Not a Fact
Plaintiffs-Appellants' ultra vires argument rests on the assumption that it has
already been determined that the Individual Defendants acted ultra vires of the UTERO
Ordinance. While they do not say so expressly, it appears that Plaintiffs-Appellants are
again are relying on the incorrect assumption that their claim that the Individual
Defendants acted ultra vires must be accepted as true for purposes of the Motion to
Dismiss. However, like the determination of whether the Individual Defendants
exceeded the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction, the question of whether the Individual
Defendants acted ultra vires of the UTERO Ordinance is a legal question that no court
has ruled on. Since the Plaintiffs-Appellants' ultra vires argument is based on this faulty
presumption, it must fail.
ii. Only the Ute Tribal Court May Determine if the
Individual Defendants Acted Ultra Vires of the UTERO
Ordinance.
As the district court found, "[w]hether the UTERO officials exceeded the scope of
authority given to them by the UTERO Ordinance necessarily requires examining and
interpreting the UTERO Ordinance, Interpreting tribal laws is outside the scope of a state
district court's general jurisdiction." (R. 1787-88.) The district court cited U.S. Supreme
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Court precedent that "`[a]djudication of such matters by any nontribal court also infringes
upon tribal law-making authority, because the tribal courts are best qualified to interpret
and apply tribal law." (R. 1788 (citing Iowa Mutual, 107 S. Ct. at 977)).
iii. The Amended Complaint Does Not Contain Any Alleged
Facts that Support Plaintiffs-Appellants' Ultra vines
Argument.
The assertion that the Individual Defendants acted ultra vires means that they
allegedly acted beyond the authority granted to them by the UTERO Ordinance. Yet the
Amended Complaint does not specify what actions allegedly taken by the Individual
Defendants violated the UTERO Ordinance, nor identifies a single provision of the
UTERO Ordinance that the Individual Defendants exceeded. Thus, once again,
Plaintiffs-Appellants assert legal arguments that have no factual basis in their Amended
Complaint and therefore may not stand.
3. The Tribe Is a Necessary and Indispensable Party.
In sum, Plaintiffs-Appellants' effort to show that the Tribe is not a necessary or
indispensable party is: (1) premised on the existence of legal conclusions that have never
been made by any court, (2) based on factors — the scope of the Tribe's authority and the
ultra vires determination — that are within the jurisdiction of the Ute Tribal Court, not the
Utah state court, and (3) not supported by the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint.
For these reasons, not only do the Plaintiffs-Appellants' new arguments on this
point fail, but they in fact reinforce the district court's finding that the Tribe is a
necessary and indispensable party, because the Tribe would be severely prejudiced if
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decisions about the scope of its jurisdiction and the application of its ordinances were
decided without it being a party to the case.
4. Plaintiffs-Appellants Consented to the Jurisdiction of the Ute
Tribal Court for the Matters Raised in the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that the district court erred when it found that
Plaintiffs-Appellants have a remedy in Tribal Court or the tribal administrative process:
"In essence the trial court determined it was appropriate that Plaintiffs subject themselves
to tribal regulatory control to address business activities the situs of which is exclusively
interstate." (Brief of Pl.-App. at 26.) As discussed supra, however, the Amended
Complaint does not contain a single allegation that the Tribe, the UTERO, or the
Individual Defendants exercised any authority off of the Reservation or sought to
interfere with Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-Reservation business activities. As the district
court found, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint establish at most that the
U IERO and the Individual Defendants exercised their authority to restrict the Plaintiffs-
Appellants' on-Reservation business activities for failure to comply with the UTERO
Ordinance. (R. 1778.)
In the proceedings below, the Individual Defendants noted that Plaintiffs-
Appellants consented to the jurisdiction of the Ute Tribal Court for resolving UTERO-
related matters when they executed the documents necessary to obtain Ute Tribal
business licenses, Ute Tribal access permits, and Ute certification. (R. 1077.) While
Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that they signed these documents under "duress" (Brief of Pl.-
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App. at 11), what they are calling "duress" was simply the insistence by the UTERO
officials that Plaintiffs-Appellants comply with the UTERO Ordinance if they wished to
continue providing goods and services to companies performing work on Tribal lands.
II. A BALANCING OF THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE AND THE
TRIBE IS NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE THE TRIBE IS NOT
ATTEMPTING TO REGULATE OFF-RESERVATION BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES.
Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the district court should have balanced the equities
in this case, claiming that the State's interests outweigh the Tribe's interests in regulating
business activity occurring off of the Reservation in the State of Utah. (Brief of Pl.-App.
28-30.) This argument fails because, as discussed supra, the Amended Complaint fails to
allege a single business activity that the Tribe or the Individual Defendants sought to
regulate on non-Tribal land. Plaintiffs-Appellants' reference to Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), and its progeny is inapposite, because in that line of cases,
the U.S. Supreme Court limited the authority of tribes over non-Indians on non-Indian
land. In the present case, however, the only action the Individual Defendants took was to
exercise authority over companies engaged in business activities on Tribal lands. There
is not a single case that challenges or begins to limit the authority of a tribe to set the
terms and conditions upon which a party may use its lands, and there are no court cases
that call for balancing of equities in such a situation. Therefore, the district court did not
need to engage in a balancing of equities in this case.
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CLAIMS
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE
TRIBE'S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARS THE SUIT.
The district court properly dismissed all claims against the Individual Defendants
on the basis that sovereign immunity bars the suit. (R. 1787.) On appeal, Plaintiffs-
Appellants assert that the Tribe's sovereign immunity does not extend to the Individual
Defendants, because the Individual Defendants were allegedly acting,u/tra vires and
beyond the scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them. These
arguments are unavailing.'
A. The Determination of Whether the Individual Defendants Acted Ultra
mires Is Outside the Jurisdiction of the Utah State Courts.
The Appeal Brief repeatedly argues that the Individual Defendants acted ultra
vires and therefore are not covered by tribal sovereign immunity. (Brief of P1,-App. at
16, 18, 19-28, 45.) This is a bald accusation; as noted supra, Plaintiffs-Appellants have
not identified a single provision of the UTERO Ordinance that they believe the Individual
Defendants exceeded or violated. Absent such alleged facts in their Amended Complaint,
this argument must fail. Further, Plaintiffs-Appellants mistakenly argue that the ultra
vires nature of the Individual Defendants' actions is a fact that must be assumed to be
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. As discussed supra, this is a question of law
that no court has ruled on, and because it requires an interpretation of tribal law (i.e., the
UTERO Ordinance), this question is outside the jurisdiction of the Utah state courts. (R.
2 Plaintiffs-Appellants consistently refer to the Individual Defendants using their official
titles, such as Commissioner or Director, supporting the argument that they are acting as
agents of the Tribe and thus entitled to protection under the Tribe's immunity.
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1787-88.) See also Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1995), superseded
by statute on other grounds by Peters v. Noonan, 871 F. Supp. 2d 218 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)) ("there is
no state or federal interest served by providing a forum other than the tribal court for the
resolution of internal tribal disputes, and as a matter of federal law, the Pennhurst rule
bars the state and federal courts from applying the [Ex Parte] Young doctrine to a tribal
law claim.").
The Amended Complaint Does Not State with Specificity What the
Individual Defendants Allegedly Did that Is Beyond the Scope of the
Authority the Tribe Is Capable of Conferring on Them; the Tribe Is
the Real Party in Interest with Respect to Questions of Its Ability to
Bestow Authority on Tribal Officials.
Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that the Tribe's sovereign immunity does not extend to
the Individual Defendants because the Individual Defendants exceeded the scope of the
authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them. (Brief of P1.-App. at 18, 21-22,
45-47.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, it is insufficiently pled, and second,
the Tribe is the real party in interest with respect to questions of what authority the Tribe
is capable of bestowing on its officials, but as explained supra, the Tribe is a necessary
and indispensable party that cannot be joined in this action.
Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to follow the standard established by the cases cited in
their Appeal Brief, which hold that in order to sustain a claim for damages against a tribal
official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff cannot merely allege that the tribal
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official violated state or federal law, but rather must plead specific facts to prove that the
official acted without any colorable claim of authority.
Although the plaintiff alleges that some of the defendants' activities were
"illegal" or "unlawful" (see, e.g., Complaint, Count Three, lig 45-46.), such
allegations are not, by themselves, sufficient to establish that the defendants
acted outside the scope of their authority. In Basset v. Mashantucket
Pequot Museum and Research Center Inc., supra, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 281,
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that "it
is insufficient for the [plaintiff] merely to allege that [the defendants]
violated state and federal law in order to state a claim that Ithe defendantsl 
acted beyond the scope of their authority; it would be tantamount to
eliminating tribal immunity from damages actions because a plaintiff must
always allege a wrong in order to state a claim for relief. Rather, the Court
finds that to state a claim for damages against [the defendants], the
plaintiffs would have to allege and prove that [the defendants] acted 
`without any colorable claim of authority,' apart from whether they acted in
violation of federal or state law."
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Dev. Co., LLC v. Rosow, No. X03CV034000160S, 2005
WL 1273260, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2005) (emphasis added). The Amended
Complaint simply asserts that the Individual Defendants violated state law; it does not
state with specificity what the Individual Defendants allegedly did that is beyond the
scope of the authority the Tribe is capable of conferring on them, nor argue that the
Individual Defendants acted without any colorable claim of authority. As noted above,
the district court found that the "minimal factual allegations" in the Amended Complaint
"fail to support the various claims the Plaintiffs set forth." (R. 1778.)
In the Appeal Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants somewhat refine their position, and as
discussed supra, appear to argue that the Individual Defendants' actions exceeded the
scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing because those actions
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allegedly occurred off of tribal land. However, as explained supra, the only actions by
the Individual Defendants that allegedly harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants were taken on
Tribal land namely, revocation of Rocks Off, Inc.'s business license and issuance of the
March 20 Letter.3 The Individual Defendants had, at a bare minimum, a colorable claim
of authority to perform these actions, as required by the Basset / Trump test; the district
court expressly recognized the Tribe's interest in regulating business activity on tribal
lands. (R. 1770.)
To the extent that Plaintiffs-Appellants are asking this Court to determine the
scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on its officers, then, as
recognized by the district court and discussed further supra, the Tribe is the real party in
interest in such a determination, and the Ute Tribal Court has initial jurisdiction over this
question.4 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit precedent establishes that when a
3 At the very end of the Facts Pleaded in Amended Complaint section of the Appeal
Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that "[a]ll acts and occurrences complained of in the
Amended Complaint occurred on fee land outside of Ute Tribal land as defined under
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). R. 562." (Brief of PL-App. at 14.) This statement
is not an accurate representation of what is contained in the Amended Complaint. A
comparison of the "Facts" in the Appeal Brief and the comparable allegations in the
Amended Complaint shows that in the latter, the allegations rarely if ever allege that the
actions occurred off of Ute Tribal lands, and never with the specificity required by the
principles set out in Trump.
4 The district court stated that "Wile Plaintiffs request the Court issue a declaratory order
limiting the Tribe, UTERO, and UTERO officials from regulating private business
activities of non-Indians outside of the tribal land. This type of relief directly involves
the Tribe, not the individual Defendants personally." (R. 1787.) The district court
further held that "a determination about whether the Tribe and its officials may issue
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tribe is the real party in interest, the tribe's sovereign immunity extends to tribal officials.
See Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001) (tribe's sovereign
immunity extends to tribal official when tribe "is the real, substantial party in interest");
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) ("Mlle general
rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the
decree would operate against the latter) (citation omitted); see also Maxwell v. Cty. of
San Diego, 708 F.3d. 1075, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (sovereign immunity did not bar suit
against the tribal employees because the tribe was not the real party in interest when
tribal employees allegedly performed grossly negligent acts off-Reservation pursuant to a
contract with a non-tribal entity). As such, the Tribe's sovereign immunity applies to the
Individual Defendants with respect to questions about the scope of authority that the
Tribe may confer on its officials.
Iv. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE TORT
CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
FACTS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.
In the Ruling and Order dated March 28, 2016, addressing the motion to dismiss
filed by the Newfield Defendants, the district court stated that, in a separate ruling, it had
found that the "Ute Tribe was a necessary and indispensable party to this action.
However, the Ute Tribe is immune from suit." (R. 1776.) The district court adopted that
decision in the Ruling and Order and stated that, while "that decision makes the
additional arguments moot, the Court will address the additional arguments as an
directives relating to oil companies' business activities, such as the directive alleged to
have been issued in this case, is a critical interest of the Tribe." (R. 1768)
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alternative basis to dismiss the Amended Verified Complaint." (Id.) The district court
then went on to conclude that the minimal factual allegations in the Amended Complaint
"failed to support the various claims the Plaintiffs set forth. The facts do not support a
finding that Newfield and the other Defendants came to a meeting of the mind to harm
the Plaintiffs' business." (R. 1778-79.) Although in this Ruling the district court was
addressing the motion to dismiss filed by the Newfield Defendants, as an alternative basis
to affirm the court's judgment in favor of the Individual Defendants and the Company
Defendants, this Court may properly rely on the independent bases for dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) cited by the district court. See State v.
Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that an appellate court may
affirm on grounds not urged below if the ground or theory "is apparent on the record")
(citation omitted).
A. Tortious Interference with Economic Relations
The district court properly dismissed the claims against the Individual Defendants
and the Company Defendants for tortious interference with economic relations. In
Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 70, 345 P.3d 553, 565, the Utah Supreme Court
stated that, to state a claim for tortious interference with economic relations, the plaintiff
must allege that the defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiffs existing or potential
economic relations, by improper means, and that the actions caused injury to the plaintiff.
"Improper means are present 'where the means used to interfere with a party's economic
relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized
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common-law rules.'" St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d at 201
(citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that the improper means used by the Individual
Defendants was the March 20 Letter. Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that "this directive is
not limited to use of the Plaintiffs on Ute Tribal land but is rather a blanket boycott/
blacklist of Plaintiffs regardless of the situs of the business activity." (Brief of Pl.-App.
at 32.) Again, Plaintiffs-Appellants' characterization of the March 20 Letter is
inaccurate. The Letter states only that the oil and gas companies to whom the Letter was
directed were not authorized to use Plaintiffs-Appellants' businesses in work conducted
on Tribal lands; the Letter does not mention off-Reservation business activities at all.
Further, the March 20 Letter was issued pursuant to the formal procedures set out in the
UTERO Ordinance. Accordingly, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellants
failed to identify any improper means to support a claim for tortious interference with
economic relations. Also, as noted by the Newfield Defendants, Plaintiffs-Appellants are
required to allege interference with an existing contract between Plaintiffs and a third
party. The Amended Complaint contains no such allegation. (See Newfield Brief at
Section V.A.5.) The claim for tortious interference was properly dismissed.
13. Extortion
In the Appeal Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants seek to support their claim for extortion,
which is not recognized under Utah law. On this point, and pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Individual Defendants and the Company
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Defendants incorporate by reference the general legal arguments advanced by the
Newfield Defendants regarding extortion. (See Newfield Brief at Section V.A.1.a.) For
the reasons set forth in the legal authorities cited by the Newfield Defendants, the
Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants assert that there is no recognized
private claim for extortion under Utah law.
Even if Utah did recognize a claim for extortion, however, the facts alleged in the
Amended Complaint are inadequate to state a claim. The Amended Complaint alleges
that "Commissioner Cesspooch attempted to extort money from Ryan in the IFA parking
lot saying that he 'sure needed a good riding horse.'" (R. 557.) The Amended Complaint
goes on to allege, however, that "Ryan refused to give Commissioner Cesspooch any
money at that time." (R. 558.) Thus, the Amended Complaint fails to identify any
property of Plaintiffs that any of the Individual Defendants or the Company Defendants
allegedly obtained by extortion. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the
claim for extortion. (R. 1780.)
C. Blacklisting
Likewise, pursuant to Rule 24(i), the Individual Defendants and the Company
Defendants incorporate by reference the general arguments made by the Newfield
Defendants regarding the nonexistence of a private cause of action for blacklisting under
Utah law. (See Newfield Brief at Section V.A.2.a-b.)
Even if such a claim existed under Utah law, however, Plaintiffs have failed to
allege any facts meeting the elements of the claim. There are no facts alleged in the
28
Amended Complaint that any of the Individual Defendants or the Company Defendants
exchanged blacklists referring to Plaintiffs. See Utah Const., art. XVI, section 4 ("The
exchange of black lists by railroad companies, or other corporations, associations or
persons is prohibited."). Instead, the sole allegation is that Director Wopsock sent a letter
(i.e., the March 20 Letter) to certain oil and gas companies advising that Plaintiffs-
Appellants were not authorized to conduct business on Tribal land and that other
companies "doing work on the Reservation" were not authorized to use Plaintiffs-
Appellants' services on tribal land. (R. 53.) The district court properly dismissed the
claim for blacklisting.
D. Antitrust
The district court also properly dismissed the claim for antitrust violations for
failure to state a claim. The Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants join in
and incorporate by reference the Newfield Defendants' general legal arguments regarding
this point. (See Newfield Brief at Section V.A.3.a.) The key element that Plaintiffs-
Appellants must allege is that there was a meeting of the minds on a common object or
course of action. "Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires that there be a 'contract,
combination „ , or conspiracy' between the manufacturer and other distributors in order
to establish a violation." Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
(1984) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1). Again, the core allegation of the Amended Complaint
focuses on the March 20 Letter from UTERO Director Wopsock. The issuance of the
Letter does not reflect a contract or combination between any of the parties in this case.
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Rather, the Letter is simply a notification to other contractors performing work on Tribal
lands that they are not authorized to do such work using Plaintiffs-Appellants' services.
As the district court correctly recognized, all "that is alleged is [that] UTERO informed
Newfield that [] Rocks Off was no longer allowed to conduct business on tribal land, and
Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs explaining that Newfield was not going to
do business with Plaintiffs due to the UTERO notice." (R. 1780.) The district court
properly dismissed the antitrust claim. (R. 1781.)
E. Civil Conspiracy
Finally, the district court properly determined that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim
for civil conspiracy. A claim for civil conspiracy requires "(1) a combination of two or
more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object
or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate
result thereof." Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, ¶ 13, 275 P.3d 1024, 1029
(citation omitted). For the same reasons as set forth above, Plaintiffs-Appellants fail to
allege a claim for conspiracy. There are no allegations in the Amended Complaint
reflecting a combination of two or more persons, with a meeting of the minds on an
object or course of action, using one or more unlawful, overt acts that resulted in
damages to Plaintiffs-Appellants. The March 20 Letter advising oil and gas companies
that they are not authorized to use Plaintiffs-Appellants' services in work on Tribal land
does not amount to a combination with any other person or entity to commit an
"unlawful" and "overt" act to damage Plaintiffs. Further, the Amended Complaint fails
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to identify any underlying tort that would support a claim for civil conspiracy.
Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the claim for civil conspiracy for
failure to state a claim.
V. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED WITH RESPECT TO THE
COMPANY DEFENDANTS.
The district court observed that "`[t]o support a claim for relief, a plaintiff 'must
have alleged sufficient facts . . • to satisfy each element of a claim.'" (R. 1785 (quoting
Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 296 P.3d 760 (Utah App. Ct. 2013)).) The district court
concluded that, in regard to the claims alleged against the Company Defendants, the
Amended Complaint "does not assert any facts supporting the claims made against these
two corporate Defendants." (R. 1785.) The court found that the Amended Complaint
"only alleges facts regarding the individual Defendants' actions as individuals and as
government officials of the Tribe. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted against these two corporate Defendants." (Id.)
In their Appeal Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants do not challenge the legal principle
upon which the district court based its holding but instead seek to rebut this finding by
quoting various references to the Company Defendants in the Amended Complaint.
However, a review of those quotations reinforces the district court's findings; not a single
one sets out facts that allege an action by either or both of the Company Defendants.
They only allege actions by their owners (see, e.g., "That LaRose, as [an] owner of
Larose Construction . . . conspired to receive an economic interest in a competing gravel
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pit . . ." and "Cesspooch, LaRose and Director Wopsock conspired to . . . ."). (Brief of
Pl.-App. at 43-44.) The only action the Company Defendants are alleged to have taken is
to "participate in the conspiracy" (id. at 44) — a conclusionary statement that clearly
failed to satisfy any, much less each, element of the claims made against the Company
Defendants, This Court should therefore should uphold the district court's dismissal of
the Amended Complaint against the Company Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6).
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING.
The Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants hereby join in the
arguments raised in Section V.0 of the Newfield Defendants' brief regarding the district
court's disposition of Plaintiffs-Appellants' motion for leave to file a supplemental
pleading. For the reasons set forth by the Newfield Defendants, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the
district court's order denying the motion.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the dismissal of all causes of action against the
Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants.
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EXHIBIT A
Ute Indian Tribe
UTERO Commission
P.O. Box 190
Fort Duchesne, UT 84026
Phone: (435) 725-4982
4/41Oura 111"
March 20, 2013
To all 011 & Gas Companies:
Please be advised that on March 15, 2013, the Tribal Energy and Minerals Department revoked
the access permits for the following businesses and individuals:
o J. Brothers Trucking & Excavation, LLC — Justin Justice, Benjamin Justice and
Thomas Justice
o Rocks Off, Inc — Ryan Harvey
As a result, the UTERO Commission revoked the UTERO License for these businesses and
individuals for failure to comply with the UTERO Ordinance, Ord, No. 10-002 (July 27, 2010).
As a result of such action, these businesses and individuals are no longer authorized to perform
work on the Uintah and. Ouray Reservation, Any use of these businesses and individuals by an
employer doing work on the Reservation after receipt of this Notice may result in the assessment
of penalties and/or sanctions against such employer to the fullest extent of the law,
If you should have any questions on the UTERO Commission decision please feel free to =tact
the OTERO Department at (435) 725-7086,
/fr
SI opsock
UTERO Director
cc: Business Committee (6)
Energy & Minerals. Dept,
U'I'BC General Counsel
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